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Rationale and Changing
The Charitable Deduction
By Roger Colinvaux
A. Introduction
Whether to change the federal income tax chari-
table deduction is part of two distinct debates —
one on the budget and one on tax reform. In the
context of a budget debate, the main issue is
whether to raise revenue from the deduction. Here,
the answer is largely one of trade-offs and is best
assessed by the impact any proposed change would
have on the section 501(c)(3) sector as compared
with revenue raised. In the context of a tax reform
debate, revenue raised or lost remains important, as
does impact. But tax reform is also meant to be
about broader questions. Comprehensive tax re-
form is a rare opportunity to revisit the purpose of
the charitable deduction and reaffirm it, or to
change direction. This article emphasizes the im-
portance of the various rationales for the deduction
to the tax reform debate and points out, without
advocating, that depending on choice of rationale,
one or another change may follow.1
To summarize the main points, there are two
principal rationales for the deduction — that of base
measurement and of subsidy. A base measurement
rationale suggests eliminating the deduction for
unrealized appreciation, keeping the benefit as a
deduction and not a credit, not adopting caps or a
non-itemizer deduction, and protecting the tax base
by narrowing the group of organizations eligible to
receive deductible contributions. A subsidy ra-
tionale, depending on which strand is emphasized,
might favor a more equitable tax benefit in the form
of a credit or through caps or a non-itemizer deduc-
tion and could lead to preferring some organiza-
tions over others. Both rationales are consistent
with placing a floor under the deduction and nar-
rowing its scope.
B. Putting the Charitable Deduction in Context
Dating from 1917, the charitable deduction is
almost as old as the income tax. It is a familiar tax
break for those who itemize deductions and a key
selling point for charitable solicitations. It is also
widely credited with promoting billions of dollars
of charitable contributions each year and is gener-
ally popular with taxpayers and donee organiza-
tions. Yet despite its longevity, several points about
the charitable deduction are not widely understood
or are misrepresented.
1. The charitable deduction is not the main fund-
ing source for the section 501(c)(3) sector. The
charitable deduction sometimes is viewed as the
sine qua non of the section 501(c)(3) sector; that is,
without the deduction there either would be no
such sector or a severely weakened one. However,
1See my testimony before the House Ways and Means
Committee on February 14. See also Roger Colinvaux, Brian
Galle, and C. Eugene Steuerle, ‘‘Evaluating the Charitable
Deduction and Proposed Reforms,’’ Urban Institute (June 2012);
Joseph J. Cordes, ‘‘Re-Thinking the Deduction for Charitable
Contributions: Evaluating the Effects of Deficit-Reduction Pro-
posals,’’ 64 Nat’l Tax J. 1001 (2011).
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income from contributions amounts to about 13
percent of total revenues for the sector in the
aggregate.2 Far more important is income from fees
(so-called program service revenue, such as tuition
or payments for healthcare) and direct government
grants. Without question, some types of organiza-
tions depend more heavily than others on deduct-
ible contributions as a source of funding. These
include organizations supporting arts and culture,
animals, the environment, and probably smaller
organizations.3 These organizations may find it
harder to adapt to a loss of contribution income
because of changes to the charitable deduction than
would organizations with substantial alternative
funding streams. But the broader point is that the
charitable deduction is, in the aggregate, not as
crucial to the sector as is often depicted.
2. Charitable contributions support much more
than basic needs. The charitable deduction is fre-
quently defended by invoking the common under-
standing of the term ‘‘charitable’’ as supporting the
poor and the needy. But charitable contributions
support a wide array of purposes and organization
types, from well-endowed universities to complex
hospital systems, to churches, museums, the opera,
think tanks, environmental groups, private founda-
tions, and donor-advised funds to name a few.4
Human services organizations receive important
support but, in the aggregate, account for just 12
percent of private giving.5
3. The charitable deduction is not neutral. On its
face, the charitable deduction appears to be a
government-neutral means of supporting the sec-
tion 501(c)(3) sector. Private donors, not govern-
ment actors, decide how to allocate funds. Thus,
although there may be winners and losers in the
race for contributions, private and not public actors
decide. Further, because the government (through
Congress, the IRS, and the courts) defines the
section 501(c)(3) sector broadly, the barriers to entry
into the sector are low, and the competition for
donor funds is thus generally open to many.
In practice, however, because of its design, the
charitable deduction is not neutral. As an itemized
deduction, it is available only to those who itemize
deductions (about one-third of taxpayers), a group
that also represents the more affluent third of the
population. Further, among itemizers, the benefits
of the deduction are claimed disproportionately by
the most affluent. For example, itemizers earning
$200,000 or more of adjusted gross income receive
37 percent of the benefits from the deduction.6 This
group represents 2.5 percent of all returns filed and
9.5 percent of returns claiming the charitable deduc-
tion.7 More broadly, itemizers earning $100,000 or
more of AGI receive 63 percent of its benefits but
represent 9.9 percent of all returns filed and 37
percent of returns claiming the charitable deduc-
tion.8 In short, although the government does not
directly pick recipients, the deduction is in practice
a tax benefit of most use to the wealthiest and
broadly reflects the funding decisions of this in-
come group.
4. The charitable deduction is not cost free. The
charitable deduction evokes our better nature. At its
best, the deduction rewards a generous act for a
worthy cause. However, the charitable deduction
also is a vehicle for tax planning, can be a magnet
for abuse, and is complex and difficult to adminis-
ter. The IRS has listed the charitable deduction as
the source of one of the ‘‘dirty dozen’’ of tax scams
for years.9 The associated costs — lost revenue,
reputational costs to the sector, and administrative
and systemic costs — are significant.
A primary source of these costs is the charitable
deduction for property contributions. On average,
more than 25 percent of the value of all charitable
contributions is of property (other than cash). This
amounts to more than $45 billion on average each
year in contributions. However, property contribu-
tions often are plagued with one or the other of
valuation concerns, overly generous tax benefits,
difficult enforcement challenges, and questions
about the extent of the public benefit conveyed.10 A
related issue is donors who attempt to retain control
2This 2009 number is of all private contributions, including
nondeductible contributions, and therefore overstates the
amount of funding attributable to the charitable deduction.
Colinvaux et al., supra note 1, at Table 3.
3Id. at Table 2. See also Cordes, supra note 1 (discussing which
types of organizations benefit from charitable contributions).
4See, e.g., National Center for Charitable Statistics classifica-
tion database, available at http://nccs.urban.org/.
5Giving USA Foundation, ‘‘Giving USA 2012: Giving Annual
Report for the Year 2011,’’ at 10. The 12 percent number
overstates giving attributable to deductible contributions be-
cause it includes giving from all sources, i.e., including gifts by
bequest, private foundations, and taxpayers who do not item-
ize.
6IRS Statistics of Income division, Tax Stats, ‘‘Individual
Statistical Tables by Size of Adjusted Gross Income, Returns
With Itemized Deductions: Itemized Deductions by Type and by
Size of Adjusted Gross Income, Tax Year 2009.’’
7Id.
8Id.
9See, e.g., IR-2012-23 (listing ‘‘abuse of charitable organiza-
tions and deductions’’ and highlighting the donation of noncash
assets).
10For additional discussion, see Colinvaux, ‘‘Charitable Con-
tributions of Property: A Broken System Reimagined,’’ 50 Harv.
J. on Legis. (2013) (forthcoming).
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over donated assets through the use of donor-
advised funds or other grant-making organizations
susceptible to donor control.
5. The charitable deduction affects giving in the
margin. Like many long-standing benefits, the
charitable deduction has become familiar and com-
fortable. It is hard to imagine (for itemizers) not
being able to take a charitable deduction for annual
giving. But if the charitable deduction were elimi-
nated, giving would not stop. Giving by non-
itemizers (two-thirds of taxpayers) should not
change.11 Giving by itemizers would be reduced,
but it is not clear by how much or which organiza-
tions would be most adversely affected.12 This does
not mean that the charitable deduction should be
eliminated but rather that the deduction should be
put into perspective — it is a supplement to but not
a condition for giving. In other words, even without
a deduction, Americans would remain generous
and mindful of favorite causes.
C. Why Do We Have a Charitable Deduction?
There are many explanations for the charitable
deduction. In general terms, there are two theoreti-
cal approaches. One is related to how best to
measure the base of income subject to income tax.
The other views the deduction as a form of govern-
ment spending or subsidy. Subsidy theories in turn
have different strands. The various explanations are
not mutually exclusive, meaning that the charitable
deduction can and does perform a variety of func-
tions within the income tax. The different theories
are summarized below.
1. Defining the proper tax base. One view of the
charitable deduction is that it is simply an appro-
priate adjustment necessary to properly measure
income. This view is foundational, in that it comes
from first principles of an income tax. Any tax must
have a base to tax — in this case, income. Defining
the base therefore is critical. For expenses outside
the base, a deduction follows as a matter of course.
Under the base measurement theory, charitable
expenses are viewed as outside the tax base. Chari-
table giving is seen as distinct from other personal
spending (say on theater tickets). Charitable giving
does not represent private consumption by the
taxpayer but rather is the transfer of consumption
opportunities to the donee.13 Relatedly, under the
base measurement approach, income spent on
charitable giving is in an important sense not avail-
able to the taxpayer — meaning that the taxpayer’s
ability to pay taxes on that income is adversely
affected. For instance, a taxpayer who gives $100 to
a section 501(c)(3) organization no longer has the
$100. The taxpayer’s ability to pay taxes on that
$100 is hindered by the gift. Arguably it would be
unfair to tax the donor the same as someone with
identical income who made no charitable contribu-
tion. In short, under a base measurement approach,
a charitable deduction simply means that charitable
expenses are properly taken outside the donor’s tax
base (and of the tax system).
2. Subsidy theories: An amalgam. Another expla-
nation of the charitable deduction is to view it as a
form of government spending, or tax expenditure.
Under this approach, as a general rule charitable
expenses are viewed as normally within the tax
base, but an exception is created in the form of a
deduction. The exception takes on the language of
subsidy, or government-provided incentive, for
charitable giving.
The question then is, why allow an exception or
subsidy for charitable expenses? Many reasons are
given. Perhaps the most common is that an excep-
tion promotes the provision of undersupplied pub-
lic goods. To the extent that section 501(c)(3)
organizations provide goods or services (such as
scientific research) that may not be provided in
sufficient quantity by the private marketplace, an
incentive is needed to help support these organiza-
tions. Another reason is that it is good public policy
to promote private giving. Thus, a governmental
incentive for private giving is not so much to
support the provision of particular goods (although
it may have this effect) but rather to promote an
important social value — giving. This contributes to
a more altruistic society. Yet another reason for the
deduction is that it uniquely allows taxpayers to
allocate what would otherwise be public funds. By
giving to a section 501(c)(3) organization, a taxpayer
directs to a private organization of the taxpayer’s
choice money that would have been collected as tax
revenue. This lets people, and not government,
decide how to prioritize funding.
11For example, charitable giving by non-itemizers for 2011
has been estimated at $42.02 billion, or 19.5 percent of all giving
by individuals. Giving USA, supra note 5, at 276.
12See, e.g., Cordes, supra note 1 (discussing the efficiency of
the deduction); Bank of America and the Center on Philan-
thropy at Indiana University, ‘‘The 2012 Bank of America Study
of High Net Worth Philanthropy,’’ at 56, 71 (Nov. 2012) (report-
ing that 31.7 percent of high net worth donors give largely
because of the tax benefit and that about 50 percent of those
households would give the same amount without a tax benefit
but that about 10 percent would dramatically decrease their
gifts).
13It is the donee, if anyone, who should pay the tax.
However, because recipients of charitable contributions are tax
exempt, no tax will be paid on the gift. Further, even in the
absence of tax exemption, gifts are excluded from the tax base
(albeit subject to a different standard of law than charitable
contributions).
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D. Changes Based on Rationale
Ideally, in the context of tax reform (as opposed
to budget concerns), any proposed changes to the
charitable deduction should be understood in terms
of one of the deduction’s rationales. For example, if
the charitable deduction is best explained by the tax
base rationale, then some changes follow from or
are consistent with this rationale more than others.
Alternatively, a subsidy rationale suggests different
changes, and these changes in turn depend on
which aspect of the subsidy rationale is empha-
sized.
1. Changes suggested by a base measurement
rationale. The base measurement rationale for the
charitable deduction has clear implications on the
tax policy of the deduction. In a nutshell, strict
adherence to the base measurement rationale (1)
favors a deduction over a credit, (2) generally
would not allow for a cap (or ceiling) on the
deduction, (3) arguably is consistent with placing a
floor under the deduction, (4) would not allow a
deduction for any appreciation in contributed prop-
erty, (5) would generally not favor a charitable
deduction for non-itemizers, and (6) would lean
toward restricting the types of organizations eli-
gible to receive deductible contributions.
The base measurement rationale favors a deduc-
tion over a credit because under the rationale, the
tax base generally is defined exclusive of charitable
giving. A deduction therefore is proper because it
completely removes the expense from the tax base.
A credit, on the other hand, may remove all or only
a portion of the expense from the tax base —
depending on the credit percentage. If the credit
percentage is less than the highest marginal rate of
the taxpayer,14 the taxpayer will pay tax on a
portion of the charitable giving expenses. Accord-
ingly, proposals that call for a credit rather than a
deduction15 are contrary to the base measurement
rationale.
For similar reasons, the base measurement ra-
tionale disfavors caps on the deduction. The effect
of a cap is to put charitable expenses above the cap
amount back into the tax base. Again, this is incon-
sistent with the base measurement rationale idea
that charitable expenses are not respective of in-
come. Accordingly, proposals calling for a cap16
generally are inconsistent with the base measure-
ment rationale.17
This line of reasoning does not apply with equal
force to placing a floor under the deduction, how-
ever. A floor is the opposite of a cap and provides
that charitable expenses under a specified amount
(the floor) are not allowed but expenses above the
floor amount are allowed. Like a cap, the effect of a
floor is to make some charitable expenses part of the
tax base, and to this extent may be viewed as
inconsistent with the base measurement rationale.
But two factors argue in favor of a floor even
under this rationale. First, to the extent charitable
gifts are not entirely altruistic and the donor derives
some personal private gain of good feeling from the
gift, a portion of a charitable gift is also a ‘‘pur-
chase’’ of that feeling — a private consumption. A
floor can be understood as recognizing the private
consumption component of a charitable contribu-
tion and so is consistent with a base measurement
rationale. Second, to the extent that the base mea-
surement rationale also is tied to protecting the
ability to pay taxes, a floor (as long as it is low
enough) may be viewed as not undermining ability
to pay. In other words, it is only when expenses rise
to a significant amount that a taxpayer’s ability to
pay is truly affected. Floors on other deductions (for
example, medical expenses) are justified on similar
grounds under a base measurement approach.
As noted, although a deduction rather than a
credit is generally the appropriate form for the tax
benefit under the base measurement rationale, in
theory the deduction should be limited to offset
only income actually realized by the taxpayer. For
example, a gift of $100 cash represents income of the
taxpayer that otherwise would be subject to tax. But
if a taxpayer gives appreciated property, the appre-
ciation in the property has not been realized and
taxed (that is, it is not taxable income of the
taxpayer). Allowing a deduction for the apprecia-
tion allows the taxpayer to offset other realized
income that is not given away and for which the
taxpayer has an ability to pay. Contrary to the base
measurement rationale, current law generally al-
lows a deduction of the appreciation. Accordingly,
14For example, assume a charitable contribution of $100. If
the highest marginal tax rate is 35 percent and there is a credit
for charitable giving equal to 30 percent of the contribution, the
tax on the $100 is $35 offset by a credit of $30, resulting in tax of
$5. A deduction, on the other hand, means no tax on the $100
contribution (assuming the percentage limitations do not ap-
ply).
15See, e.g., National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and
Reform, ‘‘The Moment of Truth,’’ at 15, 28-34 (Dec. 1, 2010) (aka
Simpson-Bowles); Bipartisan Policy Center Debt Reduction Task
Force, ‘‘Restoring America’s Future,’’ at 35-36 (Nov. 2010).
16President Obama, ‘‘Fiscal 2012 Budget’’; Martin Feldstein et
al., ‘‘Capping Individual Tax Expenditure Benefits,’’ National
Bureau of Economic Research working paper 16921 (2011).
17Section 170(b). The percentage limitations of present law
cap the deduction and therefore are generally inconsistent with
base measurement. However, to the extent that the reason for
the percentage limitations is to protect the tax base by ensuring
that charitable contributions do not eliminate tax liability al-
together, they can be viewed as a base protection measure.
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the base measurement rationale indicates changing
current law to disallow charitable deductions for
unrealized appreciation.18
In general, the base measurement rationale
would not favor a charitable deduction for non-
itemizers.19 The charitable deduction is an itemized
deduction, meaning that those who take the stan-
dard deduction (roughly two-thirds of taxpayers)
may not claim a charitable deduction. The standard
deduction can be viewed as a substitute for item-
ized deductions, including the charitable deduc-
tion, when deductible expenses are relatively low
but reasonably expected. If a taxpayer has expenses
in excess of the standard deduction amount, the
taxpayer may forgo the standard deduction and
itemize expenses instead. If a charitable deduction
were allowed in addition to the standard deduction,
without a related adjustment to the standard deduc-
tion amount, the result would be in effect to allow a
double deduction for charitable expenses. This
would run contrary to a base measurement theory
by allowing two deductions for the same expense.
Finally, the base measurement rationale is at least
agnostic toward the definition of the type of or-
ganization that is eligible to receive charitable con-
tributions, and arguably favors a more constrained
definition. Central to the rationale is that charitable
giving is distinct from private consumption. Present
law doctrines prohibiting a charitable deduction for
return benefits are meant to police private benefit
contributions. But a weak enforcement presence
and a broad definition of eligible organization mean
that many donations have significant private el-
ements. Also central to the rationale is the impor-
tance of a definite and protected tax base. The
broader the definition of eligible organizations, the
greater the erosion of the tax base. In other words,
one base-broadening measure concerning the chari-
table deduction would be to narrow the definition
of eligible organizations, thus bringing expenses
that currently are deductible back into the base.
There is nothing immutable about the present law
definition of an eligible organization under the base
measurement theory. If anything, efforts to preserve
the base would argue in favor of narrowing the pool
of eligible organizations.
2. Changes suggested by a subsidy rationale. The
subsidy rationale for the charitable deduction is
consistent with a variety of changes. As a subsidy,
the principal questions are the reason for, or pur-
pose of, the subsidy, and how to design the subsidy
to effectively produce the desired end. Depending
on the reason for the subsidy, some changes make
more sense than others. One overriding concern of
any subsidy theory is to measure responsiveness —
that is, the extent to which the deduction spurs a
particular donation. (This is not a concern of the
base measurement rationale.) If the deduction does
not affect behavior, it is unnecessary and, apart
from any symbolic value, a waste of government
resources.
a. Emphasis on promoting giving in the aggre-
gate. If the reason for the subsidy is primarily to
promote charitable giving for givings sake, then
changes to the deduction should be viewed from
the perspective of impact on giving.
The principal option in this context would be to
extend the incentive to more taxpayers. Because the
charitable deduction may be claimed only by tax-
payers who itemize their deductions, it is unavail-
able to the roughly two-thirds of taxpayers who do
not itemize but claim the standard deduction in-
stead. The standard deduction is not an incentive
for charitable giving, however. Although it takes
account of charitable contributions,20 the standard
deduction amount remains the same whether or not
a donation is made. A non-itemizer charitable de-
duction would provide a direct incentive to give
and could be expected to increase giving. Placing a
floor under the non-itemizer dededuction would be
important to target the incentive on giving that is
not already occurring, and would also minimize
revenue loss.
If increasing giving is the goal and the choice is
between a floor or a cap, a floor would be preferable
because a floor is likely to adversely affect giving
less. This is because a floor would retain the incen-
tive to give once the floor amount has been reached.
Awell-designed floor serves to eliminate the deduc-
tion for gifts that would be made with or without an
incentive (thereby also raising revenue). By con-
trast, in general, a cap eliminates the incentive once
the cap has been reached and so discourages giving
in the margins, where an incentive is most needed.
18The deduction for unrealized gain has been condemned as
‘‘inefficient and unfair,’’ a ‘‘clear error,’’ ‘‘inequitable,’’ and a
‘‘mistake.’’ Evelyn Brody, ‘‘Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to
Subsidies Overt and Covert,’’ 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 687, 720 (1999);
Richard Schmalbeck, ‘‘Gifts and the Income Tax — An Enduring
Puzzle,’’ 73 Law & Contemp. Probs. 63, 89 (2010); Daniel Halperin,
‘‘A Charitable Contribution of Appreciated Property and the
Realization of Built-In Gains,’’ 56 Tax L. Rev. 1, 4 (2002); Wendy
C. Gerzog, ‘‘From the Greedy to the Needy,’’ 87 Or. L. Rev. 1133,
1158 (2008); Calvin H. Johnson, ‘‘Ain’t Charity: Disallowing
Deduction for Kept Resources,’’ Tax Notes, Aug. 2, 2010, p. 545.
19This depends in part on the role of the standard deduction.
A non-itemizer deduction was enacted as part of the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 but allowed to expire. It was again
raised but not adopted in connection with the tax cuts of 2001.
20The standard deduction generally is viewed as a proxy for
all itemized deductions, including charitable contributions.
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The goal could be to both increase giving in the
aggregate and raise revenue. For example, if there is
a target of raising $10 billion of revenue from
changes to the deduction, there are several ways to
raise that amount but with widely different effects
on giving. As estimated by the Tax Policy Center,21
approximately $10 billion could be raised in four
different ways:
• Option 1: replace the deduction with a 15.25
percent credit;
• Option 2: impose a 22 percent cap on the
deduction;
• Option 3: impose a 1 percent AGI floor under
the deduction; or
• Option 4: extend the deduction to all taxpayers
(not just itemizers) while also imposing a 1.7
percent AGI floor.
If the reason for the subsidy is primarily to
promote giving overall, Option 4 makes the most
sense because, under the estimate, it would not
result in a net increase or decrease in giving. Second
best would be Option 3, which is estimated to lead
to a reduction in giving of between $1.4 billion and
$2.4 billion. Next is Option 2 — a loss of between $5
billion and $9.8 billion in giving. Finally, Option 1
could lead to a loss of between $6 billion and $10.8
billion in giving.
Efforts to simply encourage additional giving
also could lead to proposals that would allow
calendar year taxpayers to claim deductions for
charitable contributions made up to April 15.22
b. Emphasis on promoting an altruistic society
and private choice. Rather than promoting giving
in the aggregate, reforms might emphasize that the
deduction is a policy tool to promote an altruistic
society. Related also is that the deduction is praised
as a way to connect taxpayers more closely to
government by allowing individuals to choose how
tax revenue should be allocated. Both goals stress
the incentive aspects of the deduction and could
lead to reforms that make the charitable deduction
available to more people on an equal basis. One
reform in this context would be to extend the
charitable deduction to non-itemizers.
Relatedly, an emphasis on promoting altruism
and choice raises questions of equality and whether
some taxpayers should be rewarded more for their
choices than others.23 Here, because the incentive
takes the form of a deduction, it is often criticized
for its ‘‘upside down’’ effect,24 namely that the
amount of the tax benefit increases with the tax rate
of the donor. The result is that charitable giving is
cheapest for the wealthiest taxpayers. Moving to a
credit available to all taxpayers at the same percent-
age of charitable contributions (irrespective of tax
rate or wealth) would more equally distribute the
tax benefit.25
Proposals to cap the charitable deduction appear
to be motivated in part by equity concerns. For
example, the Obama administration proposal to cap
the deduction at 28 percent of the gift26 (even if the
taxpayer’s top marginal rate is higher) makes sense
in the context of equity — the cap directly limits the
value of the benefit to the wealthy. This proposal
also could be seen as a first step toward a credit. By
severing the tax benefit from the rate structure, it
could be easier to further modify the value of the
benefit and move toward a unified percentage. Not
all caps are the same, however. A cap on the overall
benefit derived from itemized deductions27 could,
depending on its design, largely eliminate the chari-
table incentive for those subject to the cap. This is
because charitable expenses, unlike other itemized
expenses, are discretionary and taxpayers subject to
the cap would have no incentive to make contribu-
tions.
c. A subsidy for ends. Alternatively, emphasis
could be placed less on encouraging giving and
private choices as abstract policy goals, and more
on encouraging giving for particular ends. Under
current law, a wide variety of organization types
may qualify to receive deductible contributions. But
apart from a distinction between public charities
and private foundations, all eligible organizations
are treated equally. Or put another way, current law
generally does not favor some purposes or activities
over others.
But the policy of the charitable deduction does
not have to be open-ended. Rather, the policy could
be to favor organizations that serve the social safety
net or other functions. If a functional or activities-
based approach to the tax benefit is the priority, a
credit might make more sense than a deduction,
perhaps with higher credit percentages (a larger tax
benefit) for the preferred type of organization. This
21Colinvaux et al., supra note 1, at Table 6.
22Steuerle, ‘‘A New April 15: Make it a Day of Giving
(Efficiently),’’ Urban Institute (2010).
23Retaining the charitable deduction as an itemized deduc-
tion magnifies this inequity.
24See, e.g., Brody, supra note 18, at 714.
25The point has been made that questions of progressivity
generally should not be assessed solely on the basis of one tax
benefit but rather on the tax code as a whole. See Colinvaux et
al., supra note 1, at 10-11.
26The cap would apply to all itemized deductions and
therefore does not reflect a specific policy regarding the chari-
table deduction.
27See supra note 17.
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approach could retain an incentive for all organiza-
tions that benefit under current law, but prioritize
gifts to some organizations over others by increas-
ing the tax benefit for contributions to those groups.
To a more limited extent, this division already exists
in the law, with private foundations being the
disfavored type of donee.
E. Conclusion
In the context of a comprehensive tax reform, any
number of changes to the charitable deduction
might be sensible. Before opting for any particular
reform, some consideration should first be given to
determining anew what the deduction primarily is
intended to accomplish. Importantly, if a base meas-
urement rationale for the deduction is favored,
some changes follow as a matter of course — for
example, there should be no deduction for the
appreciation in property. Other changes make less
sense (caps, moving to a credit, and a non-itemizer
deduction), and still others seem reasonable — a
floor under the deduction, and protecting the tax
base by narrowing the scope of eligible donees.
The subsidy rationale is considerably messier
because of its many variants. Virtually anything
could be consistent with a subsidy rationale. Thus,
credits, caps, floors, a non-itemizer deduction, and
better targeting the incentive to serve specific ends
all might be plausible options, depending on the
desired outcome. The main challenges become hav-
ing a clear goal and designing an incentive that is
not wasteful.
Notably, a floor is consistent with either of the
main rationales for the deduction. A floor also
would affect aggregate giving only in the margins
and have considerable administrative benefits by
eliminating many small deductions, especially of
low, difficult-to-value property contributions.
Finally, despite general resistance to altering the
charitable deduction, it is worth noting that the
charitable deduction has been modified substan-
tially since its inception. Because of the many
changes, the simple idea of tax-favored giving has
evolved into one of the most complex provisions of
a notoriously complex tax code. Unfortunately, the
changes to the deduction have been largely piece-
meal, reactive to abuses, and generally have not
directly reflected a particular rationale. What re-
mains is a confusing mix of policies and priorities.
Tax reform presents an opportunity to reconsider
the role of the charitable deduction in the tax
system — and to act accordingly.
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